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Article 5

Hedonic Damages

THE RAPIDLY BUBBLING CAULDRON*

Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman"
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the last days of its 2002 session, the Mississippi
legislature overruled a series of state supreme court decisions'
expanding the availability of damages for loss of enjoyment of
life, in one fell swoop restoring traditional principles to the
state's tort law. The comprehensive tort reform bill covered
such issues as joint and several liability, products liability, and

© 2004 Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman. All Rights Reserved.
Senior partner, Shook Hardy & Bacon L.L.P. (Washington, D.C.). Co-

author of PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (10th ed.
2000); author of COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (4th ed. 2002). Former member of the

Advisory Committees to the Restatement of the Law of Torts Projects on Products
Liability and Apportionment of Liability; member of the Advisory Committee to the
Restatement of the Law of Torts: General Principles. B.A., Boston University (1962);
J.D., Columbia University (1965).
Associate, Shook Hardy & Bacon L.L.P. (Washington, D.C.). B.S., State
University of New York College at Geneseo (1997); M.P.A., George Washington
University (2000); J.D., George Washington University (2000).
Choctaw Maid Farms, Inc. v. Hailey, 822 So. 2d 911 (Miss. 2002) (en banc)
(permitting the testimony of several character witnesses on the decedent's enjoyment of
life in a wrongful death action and allowing recovery of hedonic damages where death
was instantaneous); Dorrough v. Wilkes, 817 So. 2d 567 (Miss. 2002) (permitting
hedonic damages in a wrongful death action where the decedent was aware and
conscious of her injury for 29 hours before death); Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Johnson,
798 So. 2d 374 (Miss. 2001) (allowing hedonic damages sepairate and apart from pain
and suffering and permitting expert testimony regarding the calculation of damages for
lost enjoyment of life).
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punitive damages.2 While this reform package received
significant media coverage,3 a damages provision that
significantly alters Mississippi jurisprudence went unnoticed.
That section provided:
In any civil action for personal injury there may be a recovery for
pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life. However, there shall
be no recovery for loss of enjoyment of life as a separate element of
damages apart from pain and suffering damages, and there shall be
no instruction given to the jury which separates loss of enjoyment of
life from pain and suffering.'

It further provided that expert testimony is not admissible on
the issue of the "monetary value" of damages for "pain and
suffering and the loss of enjoyment of life," and it prohibited
damages for loss of enjoyment of life in wrongful death actions.'
Damages for loss of enjoyment of life, which have also
become known as "hedonic damages," purportedly compensate
an injured person for the loss of quality of life or the value of
life itself. Courts have defined these damages as compensating
for "the inability to perform activities which had given pleasure
to this particular plaintiff, which are distinguished from basic
losses, which are, disabilities that include the basic mechanical
"
body functions of walking, climbing, feeding oneself and so on. '
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit,
applying New Mexico law, found such factors as "the ability to
enjoy the occupation of your choice, activities of daily living,
social leisure activities, and internal well-being" as appropriate
for consideration.7 Prior to Mississippi's 2002 tort reform, that
state's supreme court considered hedonic damages appropriate
2 See H.B. 19, 3d Extraordinary Sess. (Miss. 2002) (enacted November 26,
into law by the Governor on December 3, 2002).
signed
2002 and
3

See, e.g., Lynne W. Jeter, Business Liability Legislation an Early Gift?,

MISS. Bus. J., Dec. 9, 2002, at 1; Governor Signs Tort Reform Bill, CHI.TRIB., Dec. 4,
2002, at 21; Tim Lemke, Mississippi Restricts Lawsuit Damages, WASH. TIMES, Nov.

27, 2002, at Al.
4 H.B. 19, 3d Ex. Sess., § 10 (Miss. 2002) (effective January 1, 2003, and
codified at MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-69 (2003)).

' See id.

See McGarry v. Horlacher, 775 N.E.2d 865, 877-78 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002)
(internal quotations omitted) (quoting with approval the trial court's definition of
hedonic damages and ruling that the trial court properly excluded expert testimony on
hedonic damages).
' Smith v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 214 F.3d 1235, 1245-46 (10th Cir. 2000)
(internal quotations omitted) (finding that while expert testimony on the calculation of
hedonic damages was impermissible, expert testimony on the definition of hedonic
damages included "four broad areas of human experience" that the jury could consider
in determining an award).
6
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to remedy the lost enjoyment of "going on a first date, reading,
debating politics, the sense of taste, recreational activities, and
family activities."8 Applying this reasoning, a person injured in
a car accident might recover - in addition to separate awards
for past and future pain and suffering and disability - for being
"deprived of the simple enjoyments of a father with a young
child" and the enjoyment of outdoor recreational activities.!
Despite the retrenchment of Mississippi law, a growing
minority of state courts are gradually expanding the
availability of hedonic damages."8 The Ohio Supreme Court
recognized the beginning of this trend in 1992. As the court
observed:
[Riecently in Ohio, as elsewhere, plaintiffs' attorneys have more
frequently included an additional element of damage, which they
generally term "loss of enjoyment of life," in complaints in personal
injury actions. . . . [Tihe question remains for our consideration
whether such damage, be it known as loss of enjoyment of life or by
another name, may be allowed in other types of negligence actions,
and may be considered as a separate element of damages in the jury
instructions, interrogatories submitted to the jury, and in a special
verdict form. 1

As the Supreme Court of Texas recently recognized,
"Courts across the country have struggled with whether loss of
See Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 798 So. 2d 374, 381
(Miss. 2001).
See Matos v. Clarendon Nat'l Ins. Co., 808 So. 2d 841,
848 (La. Ct. App.
2002); see also Fantozzi v. Sandusky Cement Prods. Co., 597 N.E.2d 474, 486 (Ohio
1992) ("Such damages include loss of ability to play golf, dance, bowl, play musical
instruments, engage in specific outdoor sports, along with other activities.").
'o See infra note 39 and accompanying text. State legislators have also
demonstrated a recent interest in hedonic damages. Rhode Island Governor Lincoln
Almond recently vetoed legislation that would have permitted recovery of hedonic
damages in wrongful death actions. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the Governor,
State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Almond Vetoes Bills Concerning
Jury Selection,
Wrongful
Death Actions (July 12,
2001),
available
at
http://www.uri.edu/library/special-collections/almond/press/documents/julyl20lc.html.
The Governor stated:
I have three principle objections to awarding damages for the loss of
enjoyment of life.... The intangible, emotional, and highly subjective nature
of hedonic damages may lead to disproportionate awards. And, the social
burden of providing such speculative damages will ultimately be borne by the
public through increased insurance premiums. Second, hedonic damages can
create double recovery (for the same loss) for survivors. Third, some
advocates view hedonic damages as a way of punishing the wrongdoer. I do
not share this view.
Id. (quoting Governor Almond).
" See Fantozzi, 597 N.E.2d at 483. The Ohio Supreme Court ruled that loss
of enjoyment of life as a separate element of damages would be redundant with
damages for the "inability to perform the usual activities of life," but was distinct from
pain and suffering. See id. at 485-86.
8

9

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

1040

[Vol. 69:3

enjoyment of life is compensable at all, and if so, whether it is
part of pain and suffering, mental anguish, or physical
impairment, or is a separate, independent category of
damages."12 This Article aims to provide guidance to courts and
legislatures considering these questions. Part II examines the
development of hedonic damages, places them in the broader
context of tort law, and briefly discusses their calculation. Part
III outlines the numerous problems with hedonic damages.
First, counting hedonic loss separate and apart from pain and
suffering creates a significant risk of double compensation.
Second, hedonic damages threaten legislative and judicial
limits on the size of punitive or non-economic damages,
potentially leading to windfall awards. Moreover, hedonic
damage awards challenge important, time-tested principles
underlying wrongful death statutes and survivorship actions,
which usually and wisely limit recovery to pecuniary loss. Not
only is the idea of hedonic damages conceptually lacking, but
the measure suffers from evidentiary problems. Because
purported experts can offer no real economic baseline in
quantifying the incalculable value of life, the testimony often
prejudices by leading jurors to an arbitrary and inflated award.
Finally, there is no reliable systemic check at the end of the
process, as the highly subjective nature of hedonic damages
makes meaningful appellate review quite difficult. After
concluding that hedonic damages are fraught with problems,
this Article suggests that courts and state legislatures act to
stop their development as a new, separate category of damages.
II.

THE ORIGIN AND THEORY OF HEDONIC DAMAGES

A.

The Rise of Hedonic Damages

Hedonic damages are not a new idea. As a Louisiana
appellate court recognized, "[wihile this term is new to our
jurisprudence, the concept is not." 3 Prior to the mid- to late1980s, courts did not refer to hedonic damages, but instead
awarded damages for "loss of enjoyment of life." These damages
were usually part of damages for pain and suffering or a

" Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 768 (Tex. 2003)
(compiling cases).
13 Foster v. Trafalgar House Oil & Gas, 603 So. 2d 284, 285 (La. Ct. App.
1992).

HEDONICDAMAGES

20041

1041

general damage award.1 4 Today, however, with increasing
frequency in personal injury and wrongful death actions,
plaintiffs' lawyers are attempting to introduce expert testimony
on hedonic damages and requesting that courts provide juries
with a separate instruction and verdict form for lost enjoyment
of life.
The term "hedonic damages" made its debut in the
1980s when economists began using the term to explain the
non-pecuniary damages available in any given case. "Hedonic,"
derives from the Greek "hadon(a)" or "hadonik6s," meaning
"pleasure" or "pleasurable."" Dr. Stanley V. Smith,
an
economist and financial consultant, is given credit as coining
the phrase in a § 1983 federal civil rights lawsuit, Sherrod v.
Berry." In that case, the decedent, an innocent AfricanAmerican male who unknowingly offered a ride to a man who
had just robbed a florist, was shot by police after being pulled
over in a white Illinois suburb." Subsequently, the decedent's
See id.

14

15 See WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY

657 (1994).
Hedonism can be traced back to the writings of the ancient philosophers, Aristippus (c.
435-366 BC) and Epicurus (c. 341-271 BC). Aristippus, the founder of the Cyrenaic
school of hedonism and a disciple of Socrates, believed that the good life rests upon the
belief that pleasure is the highest and pain is the lowest human value - and one that
should be avoided. Epicurus later expanded on this thinking and suggested that people
act for the sake of ultimately gaining pleasure.
Hedonic thinking continued in modern times with Jeremy Bentham (17481832). Bentham, a lawyer by trade, believed that the goal of all human conduct is to
obtain happiness, and that consequently actions that are "right" provide pleasure and
those that are "wrong" result in pain. As Bentham wrote:
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters,

pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as
well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right
and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their
throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort
we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and

confirm it.
JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION

ch. I, § 1 (J.H. Bums & H.L.A. Hart eds., Methuen 1982) (1789). It is on the basis of

pleasures and pains that Bentham thought one could construct a "calculus of value,"

including "Hedons," units of pleasure, and "Dolors," units of pain. Bentham did not
advocate selfishness. Rather, Bentham's "hedonic utilitarianism" proposed that
legislators determine the interests of the community on the basis of the interests of the
individual, and strive to achieve the greatest happiness for the greatest number. See
id. ch. IV, § 5. Bentham could not have anticipated that a similar calculus would be
used to arrive at a monetary award for the lost enjoyment of life in a private lawsuit, as
they are today.
16

See Marcia Coyle, Updating 'Hedonic' Damages, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 9,
2001, at

Al (most likely referring to Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F. Supp. 159 (N.D. Ill. 1985), affd,
827 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1987), reh'g granted and opinion vacated on other grounds, 835
F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1988), on reh'g en banc, 856 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1988)).
17 See Sherrod, 629 F. Supp. at 160-62.
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father, as administrator of his son's estate, brought a wrongful
death action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the city, its police
chief, and the police officer."8 The court found that "the loss of
life means more than being deprived of the right to exist, or of
the ability to earn a living; it includes deprivation of the
pleasures of life."" It then permitted the testimony of Dr.
Smith, who explained that "hedonic value" refers to "the larger
value of life . . . including economic, including moral, including
philosophical, including all the value with which you might
hold life." 2' The trial resulted in a jury verdict for $300,000 in
2'
compensatory damages and $850,000 in hedonic damages. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld
the admission of Dr. Smith's expert testimony, found that the
award did not violate the rule against "speculative damages,"
and did not require remittitur.22
Due to variations in application between individual
courts and because many state supreme courts have not ruled
on the issue, it is difficult to precisely gauge the extent to
which states allow juries to separately award hedonic damages.
Most jurisdictions appear to regard hedonic damages as an
23
element of pain and suffering or disability. The highest courts
of Kansas, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and
appellate-level decisions in California, Minnesota, and Texas,
support this position.2 Other states, including Maryland, New
Mexico, South Carolina, and Wyoming, allow recovery of
5
hedonic damages as a separate element of damages. Some
courts appear to allow recovery of hedonic damages in some
situations, such as to compensate for the loss of a specific skill,
but not in other situations, such as wrongful death and
survival actions.26 In some states, such as Louisiana, appellate
18 See id. at 162-63.

9 Id. at 163.
Id.
21 See Sherrod, 827 F.2d at 208 (awarding $300,000 for "pecuniary loss to the
estate" and $850,000 for "the value of [the decedant's] life").
at 205-09.
22 Id.
23 See infra Part III.A.
24 See id.
20

20

See id.

26 Compare Kirk v. Wash. State Univ., 746 P.2d 285, 292-93 (Wash. 1987)

(allowing injured cheerleader to recover for "loss opportunity or loss of a chance to
become a professional dance performer"), with Wooldridge v. Woolet, 638 P.2d 566, 570
(Wash. 1981) (en banc) (finding that "lost pleasures ... essentially represent pain and
suffering" and were not available in a survival action where the decedent was killed in
a car accident).
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courts split on the issue and the law is largely in flux.27 Hedonic
damages remain unknown in a few states.28 Most courts do
agree, however, that "expert" testimony on hedonic damages
has no place in the courtroom29 and that hedonic damages are
not available in wrongful death or survival actions."0
B.

CalculatingHedonic Damages:Priceless

In 1997, MasterCard launched a successful advertising
campaign that pointed out the "priceless" moments in life.
MasterCard's "Priceless" ads proclaimed, "There are some
things money can't buy. For everything else, there's
MasterCard." The ads emphasized the personal relationships
and sentimental, special moments that make life good. It is
priceless, for example, for a preschooler to spill most of the
milk from her cereal bowl down her shirt, for a mother to take
her adult daughter to the place where she first met her
husband, or for a child to come home after a night of camping
in the neighbor's backyard. The notion of hedonic damages,
however, takes the opposite approach. It implies that every
positive life experience can and should be converted into a cash
equivalent, and asks the jury to do so.
Juries have two ways of arriving at an economic value
for the lost enjoyment of life or the loss of life itself. The first
27 Several courts in Louisiana permit a separate
award for hedonic damages.
See, e.g., Bruce v. State Farm Ins. Co., 859 So. 2d 296, 300, 306 (La. Ct. App. 2003)
(ruling that "[a] plaintiff is entitled to recover damages for loss of enjoyment of life if he
proves that his lifestyle was detrimentally altered or if he was forced to give up
activities because of his injury" and therefore upholding a $7,500 award for loss of
enjoyment of life on top of a $20,000 pain and suffering award); Matos v. Clarendon
Nat'l Ins. Co., 808 So. 2d 841, 847-48 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (ruling that separate damage
award of $45,000 for loss of enjoyment of life to motorist injured in rear-end collision
was not duplicative of damages awarded for pain and suffering and disability); Day v.
Ouachita-Parish Sch. Bd., 823 So. 2d 1039 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (upholding separate
awards for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life to a high school athlete who
injured his back in weight training class and could no longer participate in sports at
the varsity level). Some Louisiana courts have taken the opposite approach. See, e.g.,
Mistich v. Volkswagen of Germany, Inc., 698 So. 2d 47, 51 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (ruling
that hedonic damages are included in pain and suffering "because, like pain and
suffering, they cannot be quantified with any degree of 'pecuniary exactitude' or
measured definitely in terms of money") (quoting Foster v. Trafalgar House Oil & Gas
Co., 603 So. 2d 284, 285 (La. Ct. App. 1992).
'8 See Anderson v. Hale, No. CIV-02-0113-F, 2002 WL 32026151, at *7 (W.D.
Okla. Nov. 4, 2002) (noting that "[h]edonic damages, as a subject of recovery separate
from (or even to be expressed separately from) those elements of damages [contained in
Oklahoma's Uniform Jury Instructions], are unknown to Oklahoma law").
29 See infra Part
III.C.
30 See infra Part III.B.3.
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method involves a measure similar to the one used for pain and
suffering. This method asks jurors to use their own life
experience and judgment to arrive at an award based on how
much enjoyment of life they feel the injured party has lost. The
jury may rely on testimony from people who knew the injured
party, combined with their own values, to determine the
plaintiffs lost enjoyment of life. For example, in a recent
Mississippi wrongful death case, the court permitted five
character witnesses - out of roughly sixteen proposed by the
plaintiffs lawyer - to testify about the decedent, his family,
and the loss of enjoyment of life he suffered through his death.'
The second approach calculates hedonic damages
according to a supposedly scientific formula, derived from
government studies and models of consumer behavior and
worker risk avoidance. This formula, which incorporates expert
testimony, including that of economists and psychologists, is
more fully described in Part III.C below. As the next Part
shows, each of these methods for valuating hedonic damages is
flawed because it is highly subjective and incapable of
meaningful judicial review.
III. PROBLEMS WITH HEDONIC DAMAGES
A.

The Dangerof Redundancy

Among the gravest risks hedonic damages pose is the
risk of double counting. Cognizant of this risk, most states
permit the jury to consider hedonic damages, but only as a
component of general damages, pain and suffering, or
disability." For instance, in one of the first cases to face the
See Choctaw Maid Farms, Inc. v. Halley, 822 So. 2d 911, 921-22 (Miss.
2002). On appeal, the court found that if any error was committed by the trial court in
permitting the cumulative testimony, it was harmless. See id. at 922. Surely, repeated
testimony about how much a person loved his family and enjoyed his life just before
being instantly killed in a collision with a truck has real potential for invoking passion
and prejudice with the jury.
32 See, e.g., Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 763-72
(Tex. 2003) (recognizing that "Texas courts of appeal have uniformly held that loss of
enjoyment of life is not a separate category of damage" and holding that "in the proper
case, when the evidence supports such a submission, loss of enjoyment of life fits best
among the factors a factfinder may consider in assessing damages for physical
31

impairment ....

but the jury should be instructed that the effect of any physical

impairment must be substantial and extend beyond any pain, suffering, mental
anguish, lost wages or diminished earning capacity and that a claimant should not be
compensated more than once for the same elements of loss or injury."); Gregory v.
Carey, 791 P.2d 1329, 1336 (Kan. 1990); McAlister v. Carl, 197 A.2d 140, 142 (Md.
1964) ("Under the usual form of instructions in Maryland relating to damages in
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issue, Huff v. Tracy, a California appellate court found that a
trial court erred in an automobile accident case when it
instructed the jury on both general damages and loss of
enjoyment of life.' The court explained:
The standard pain-and-suffering instruction... describes a unitary
concept of recovery not only for physical pain but for fright,
nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, mortification, shock, humiliation,
indignity, embarrassment, apprehension, terror or ordeal. A
separate enjoyment-of-life instruction only repeats what is
effectively communicated by the pain-and-suffering instruction.
Commentators have pointed out that the enjoyment-of-life
instruction opens the possibility of double compensation. A trial
court errs when it follows the pain-and-suffering instruction by
another which tells the jurors that they may also, that is,
additionally, award damages for injury to the enjoyment of life.'

In 1995, the Nebraska Supreme Court addressed the
availability of hedonic damages in two cases involving the

negligence cases involving personal injuries, recovery of damages for non-pecuniary
harm is allowed as compensation for pain and suffering.); Leonard v. Parrish, 420
N.W.2d 629, 634 (Minn. App. 1988) (ruling that the trial court properly rejected a
request for a separate instruction for loss of enjoyment of life and that such injury was
adequately covered as a general element of damages); Anderson/Couvillon v. Neb. Dep't
of Soc. Servs., 538 N.W.2d 732, 739-41 (Neb. 1995); McDougald v. Garber, 73 N.Y.2d
246, 256-58, 536 N.E.2d 372, 376-77 (N.Y. 1989); Fantozzi v. Sandusky Cement Prods.
Co., 597 N.E.2d 474, 484-87 (Ohio 1992); Willinger v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr., 393
A.2d 1188, 1191 (Pa. 1978) ("Even where the victim survives a compensable injury, this
Court has never held that loss of life's pleasures could be compensated other than as a
component of pain and suffering."); Wooldridge v. Woolett, 638 P.2d 566, 570 (Wash.
1981) (en banc) (finding Willinger persuasive authority and finding that "lost pleasures
...essentially represent pain and suffering"); see also Spencer v. A-1 Crane Serv., Inc.,
880 S.W.2d 938, 943-44 (Tenn. 1994) (ruling that hedonic damages were inappropriate
in a wrongful death case and criticizing the reasoning of Sherrod); but cf Lawrence v.
Town of Brighton, No. 02A01-9801-CV-00020, 1998 WL 749418, at *4-5 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Oct. 28, 1998) (limiting Spencer to wrongful death cases and recognizing loss of
enjoyment of life as a distinct category of damages in personal injury cases).
33 129 Cal. Rptr. 551, 553 (Cal. App. 1976). The
court gave the following two
instructions:
(1) Reasonable compensation for any pain, discomfort, fears, anxiety, and
mental and emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff and of which his
injury was a proximate cause and for similar suffering reasonably certain to
be experienced in the future from the same cause.
(2) You may also award plaintiff reasonable compensation for the physical
and mental effects of the injury on his ability to engage in those activities
which normally constitutes (sic) the enjoyment of life.
Id. at 553 n.1 & n.2.
Id. at 553 (internal quotations and citations omitted). The court found that
that the error was harmless, however, because of the relatively small jury award and
because the jury did not receive written instructions but rather as "part of an oral flow
of instructions." Id. at 554.

1046
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negligent placement of children in foster homes.35 The court
reaffirmed that "[I]oss of enjoyment of life may, in a particular
case, flow from a disability and be simply part thereof, and
where the evidence supports it, may be argued to the jury. A
separate instruction therein may be redundant."" It further
explained that "while consideration of loss of the enjoyment of
life may properly be considered as it relates to pain and
suffering, and to disability, it is improper to treat it as a
separate category of nonpecuniary damages.""7 Likewise, after
considering the various approaches taken by courts with
respect to awarding hedonic damages, the Supreme Court of
Kansas:
took the more realistic approach that, as a general rule, the loss of
enjoyment of the pleasurable things in life is inextricably included
within the more traditional areas of damages for disability and pain
and suffering. While it is true that a person may recover from the
physical pain of a permanent injury, the resultant inability to carry
on one's normal activities would appear to fall within the broad
category of disability. In the majority of cases, loss of enjoyment of
life as a separate category of damages would result in a duplication
or overlapping of damages.'

A growing minority of courts, however, permit hedonic
damages as a separate and distinct award. This trend is
exemplified by recent decisions in Mississippi (now superceded
by statute) and South Carolina, and follows similar rulings by
the highest courts of Maryland, New Mexico, Washington, and
Wyoming, as well as the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit as it interpreted Tennessee law. 9
31 See Talle v. Neb. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 541 N.W.2d 30 (Neb. 1995), appeal
after remand, 572 N.W.2d 790 (Neb. 1998); Anderson, 538 N.W.2d at 739.
36 Anderson, 538 N.W.2d at 739 (quoting Swiler v. Baker's Super Mkt., Inc.,

277 N.W.2d 697, 700 (Neb. 1979)); see also Westcott v. Crinklaw, 133 F.3d 658, 660-61
(8th Cir. 1998) (ruling that Nebraska law does not permit a separate jury instruction
for hedonic damages).
17 Anderson, 538 N.W.2d at 741. Hawaii law specifically provides
that loss of
enjoyment of life is recoverable as a component of noneconomic damages. See HAW.
REV. STAT. § 663-8.5(a) (2002) ("Noneconomic damages which are recoverable in tort
actions include damages for pain and suffering, mental anguish, disfigurement, loss of
enjoyment of life, loss of consortium, and all other nonpecuniary losses or claims.")
(emphasis added).
See Gregory, 791 P.2d 1329, 1336 (Kan. 1990).
39 See Thompson v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 621 F.2d 814, 824-25 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1035 (1980); McAlister v. Carl, 197 A.2d 140 (Md. 1964)
(may be awarded in certain cases, but later precedent says not available in wrongful
death cases); Kansas City S. Ry. v. Johnson, 798 So. 2d 374 (Miss. 2001) (superceded by
statute); Romero v. Byers, 872 P.2d 840 (N.M. 1994); Boan v. Blackwell, 541 S.E.2d 242
(S.C. 2001); Kirk v. Wash. State Univ., 746 P.2d 285 (Wash. 1987) (en banc) (but not in
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Courts permitting recovery for hedonic loss as a
separate element of damages attempt to draw technical
distinctions between the concepts of pain and suffering,
disability, and lost enjoyment of life. For instance, in Kirk v.
Washington State University, a twenty-year-old cheerleader
who permanently injured her elbow during practice sued the
university, claiming damages to compensate for the inability to
become a professional dancer.4 The Washington Supreme
Court rejected the defendant's argument that damages for pain
and suffering and for disability and disfigurement already
encompassed hedonic damages.' In that case, the court
distinguished pain and suffering as compensating for "physical
and mental discomfort," disability as compensating for the
"inability to lead a normal life," and recovery for lost wages or
earning capacity as compensating for economic loss. 4 2 In the
court's analysis, such measures did not reach the noneconomic
rewards of being a dancer. It would appear, however, that if
the cheerleader was able to continue to lead a normal life, her
loss stemmed from the heartache caused by accepting that she
is unlikely to achieve her personal and professional goal of
becoming a dancer. This emotion is properly considered by a
jury as a part of pain and suffering.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, interpreting Tennessee law, has made a similar
distinction. In Thompson v. NationalR.R. PassengerCorp., the
trial court awarded passengers who sustained injuries in an
Amtrak derailment separate damages for "1) expenses, 2) pain,
suffering, and fright, 3) permanent injuries, 4) impairment of
earning capacity, and 5) impairment of enjoyment of life."" The
Sixth Circuit distinguished and upheld the multiple awards:
'

Permanent impairment compensates the victim for the fact of being
permanently injured whether or not it causes any pain or
inconvenience; pain and suffering compensates the victim for the

survival actions); Mariner v. Marsden, 610 P.2d 6 (Wyo. 1980); see also Ogden v. J.M.
Steel Erecting, Inc., 31 P.3d 806, 812-13 (Ariz. App. 2002) (ruling in a case of first
impression in Arizona that hedonic damages may be awarded separately from pain and
suffering and disability).
40 See Kirk v. Wash. State Univ., 746 P.2d 285 (Wash.
1987).
41 See id. at 292.
42 Id. at 292-93.
43 See

id. The Court limited its holding to cases in which the injured party
experiences a "loss of a specific unusual activity," such as artistic or athletic skills,
rather than a general loss of enjoyment of life. See id.
44 Thompson v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 621 F.2d 814, 823 (6th
Cir. 1980).
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physical and mental discomfort caused by the injury; and loss of
enjoyment of life compensates the victim for the limitations on the
person's life created by the injury."

Most recently, in an automobile negligence case in
which the only issue for the jury was the amount of damages to
be awarded, the Supreme Court of South Carolina made a
similar distinction:
An award for pain and suffering compensates the injured person for
the physical discomfort and the emotional response to the sensation
of pain caused by the injury itself [with separate damages for mental
anguish where warranted by the evidence].... On the other hand,
damages for "loss of enjoyment of life" compensate[s] for the
limitations, resulting from the defendant's negligence, on the injured
person's ability to participate in and derive pleasure from the normal
activities of daily life, or for the individual's inability to pursue his
46
talents, recreational interests, hobbies or avocations.

Based on this distinction, the court ruled that "'loss of
enjoyment of life' and 'pain and suffering' are separately
compensable elements of damages.
Regardless of whether a technical distinction can be
drawn between the concepts, in practice, allowing a separate
award for hedonic damages poses an extraordinary risk of
duplicative damage awards. In McDougald v. Garber,the New
York Court of Appeals answered the technical distinctions
described above.' In that case, the jury awarded a plaintiff,
who was rendered comatose through the negligence of her
physician, a total of $9.6 million in damages, including $1
million for pain and suffering and a separate $3.5 million
award for the "loss of the pleasures and pursuits of life." 9 The
Court of Appeals vacated the $3.5 million hedonic damages
award, rejecting separate awards for pain and suffering and
lost enjoyment of life:
The advocates of separate awards contend that because pain and
suffering and loss of enjoyment of life can be distinguished, they
must be treated separately if the plaintiff is to be compensated fully
for each distinct injury suffered. We disagree. Such an analytical
approach may have its place when the subject is pecuniary damages,
which can be calculated with some precision. But the estimation of

45 Id. at 824.

Boan v. Blackwell, 541 S.E.2d 242, 244 (S.C. 2001).
" Id. at 243.
18 See 536 N.E.2d 372, 73 N.Y.2d 246
(1989).
'9 See 536 N.E.2d at 373, 73 N.Y.2d at 251-52.
46
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nonpecuniary damages is not amendable to such analytical precision
and may, in fact, suffer from its application. Translating human
suffering into dollars and cents involves no mathematical formula; it
rests, as we have said, on a legal fiction. The figure that emerges is
unavoidably distorted by the translation. Application of this murky
process to the component parts of nonpecuniary injuries (however
analytically distinguishable they may be) cannot make it more
accurate. If anything, the distortion will be amplified by repetition.'

The court recognized that if it were to allow separate awards, it
had "no doubt that, in general, the total award for
nonpecuniary damages would increase" and emphasized that "a
larger award does not by itself indicate that the goal of
compensation has been better served."51
Prior to the rise of hedonic damages, courts addressed a
similar question with respect to damages for "pain" and
damages for "suffering."" Although the two concepts are
analytically distinguishable, courts recognized pain and
suffering to be a single element of damages because of the
potential for duplicative awards. As the California Supreme
Court explained,
In general, courts have not attempted to draw distinctions between
the elements of 'pain' on the one hand, and 'suffering' on the other;
rather, the unitary concept of 'pain and suffering' has served as a
convenient label under which a plaintiff may recover not only for
physical pain but for fright, nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry,
mortification, shock, humiliation, indignity, embarrassment,
apprehension, terror, or ordeal.'

As an analytical matter, "pleasure" and "pain" are
related words of opposite meaning.' Awarding damages both
for "lost pleasure" and "pain and suffering" appears entirely
redundant. Furthermore, to the extent that hedonic damages
compensate a victim for the lost ability to undertake a physical
activity, those damages are already provided for as disability.
For instance, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania explained the
interrelatedness of pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of
life in Corcoranv. McNeal:
See 536 N.E.2d at 376-77, 73 N.Y.2d at 257 (emphasis added).

5' Id. at 376.

"' See, e.g., Smith v. Pittsburg, Fort Wayne & Chicago Ry. Co., 23 Ohio St. 10,
18-19 (1872).
Capelouto v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 500 P.2d 880, 883 (Cal. 1972) (footnote
omitted); see also Fantozzi v. Sandusky Cement Prods. Co., 597 N.E.2d 474, 484 (Ohio
1992) ("Generally, pain and suffering has been viewed as a unitary concept.").
'4 ROGET'S II: THE NEW THESAURUS 740 (3rd ed. 1995).
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The loss of well-being is as much a loss as an amputation.
inability to enjoy what one has heretofore keenly appreciated
pain which can be equated with the infliction of a positive hurt.
conscious loss of a benefit to which one is entitled hurts as much
festering wound.5

The
is a
The
as a

Apart from the analytical murkiness, there is a problem
of application. The subjective nature of lost enjoyment of life
enhances the potential for excessive awards in personal injury
cases. This is especially so because alongside pain and
suffering damages, juries are asked to decide a second
subjective award. As early as 1938, the Kansas Supreme Court
did not permit an accomplished sixty-three-year-old violinist to
recover for her loss of enjoyment of life when an injury
prevented her from playing the violin.' In that case, the
majority held that "loss of enjoyment ... is too speculative and
conjectural to form a sound basis for the assessment of
damages. " " Juries must perform an even more subjective
determination of hedonic damages when the case does not
involve the lost enjoyment of some specific and valuable skill,
but rather the loss of a general enjoyment of life or the loss of
life itself, as in a wrongful death case.
In sum, hedonic damages pose the risk of double
counting for two major reasons. First, the standard is quite
conceptually similar to both pain and suffering and disability,
especially when one considers that pain and suffering may
continue after its physical dimension passes, and that
disability necessarily must continue into the future. But even if
there is an analytical distinction, the problem of application
remains. Given that hedonic damages, like pain and suffering,
cannot be measured against a concrete economic baseline,
there is no way for a jury to keep the categories distinct in their
calculations.

55 161 A.2d 367, 372-73 (Pa. 1960) (ruling that loss of enjoyment of life is
recoverable only as an element of pain and suffering).
See Hogan v. Santa Fe Trail Trans. Co., 85 P.2d 28, 33 (Kan. 1938).
57 Id. at 32; see also McAlister v. Carl, 197 A.2d 140 (Md. 1964) (holding that
the trial court properly did not submit to the jury a student's claim for hedonic
damages when she was unable to pursue her chosen profession as a physical education
teacher due to an injury sustained in a car accident). In a more recent case
demonstrating the trend toward greater availability of hedonic damages, the Supreme
Court of Washington permitted a twenty-year-old college cheerleader who sustained a
permanent injury to her elbow to recover for the "the reasonable value of the lost
opportunity or loss of a chance to become a professional dance performer." See Kirk v.
Wash. State Univ., 746 P.2d 285, 292 (Wash. 1987).
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Hedonic Damages as an End-Run Around Liability
Rules

This section addresses how hedonic damages pose
additional risks different in kind from double counting but with
the similar effect of inappropriately aggravating jury awards.
Apart from the danger described above, hedonic damages
provide opportunities for escaping various liability limits,
namely, caps on punitive damages, the cognitive awareness
requirement for compensatory, non-economic damages, and the
scope of remedies for wrongful death. Each limit, and the effect
hedonic damages has upon it, is discussed in turn.
1. Avoiding Limits on Punitive Damages
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the size and number
of punitive damage awards "increased dramatically".. and
"unprecedented numbers of punitive awards in product liability
and other mass tort situations began to surface." 9 In light of
the rampant nature of excessive punitive awards, a number of
states enacted legislation to address the problem.' At least
fifteen states placed limits on the amount of such awards.61 The
George L. Priest, PunitiveDamages and EnterpriseLiability, 56 S. CAL. L.
REV. 123, 123 (1982).
59 John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on The
Constitutionalityof Punitive
Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139, 142 (1986); see also PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE
LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988); WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION
EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (1991). Until
1976, there were only three reported appellate court decisions upholding awards of
punitive damages in product liability cases, and the punitive damages award in each
case was modest in proportion to the compensatory damages awarded. See Gillham v.
Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1975) ($125,000 compensatory damages, $50,000
attorneys' fees, $100,000 punitive damages); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 60 Cal.
Rptr. 398 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) ($175,000 compensatory, $250,000 punitive damages);
Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 253 N.E.2d 636 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969) ($920,000 compensatory
damages, $10,000 punitive damages), affd, 263 N.E.2d 103 (Ill. 1970).
60 See, e.g., Leo M. Stepanian, II, The Feasibility of Full State Extraction of
Punitive Damages Awards, 32 DUQ. L. REV. 301, 302-03 (1994) (describing various
statutory curbs on punitive damages).
61 A few states have simply abolished punitive
damage awards. For example,
the Louisiana Civil Code permits award of punitive damages only when authorized:
(1) By the law of the state where the injurious conduct occurred and by either
the law of the state where the resulting injury occurred or the law of the
place where the person whose conduct caused the injury was domiciled; or
(2) By the law of the state in which the injury occurred and by the law of the
state where the person whose conduct caused the injury was domiciled.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3546 (West 2003); see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:16
(2003) (permitting punitive damages awards only when expressly provided for by
statute); Schiller v. Strangis, 540 F. Supp. 605 (D. Mass. 1982); Fisher Props., Inc. v.
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most common statutory limit on punitive damage awards is the
greater of three times compensatory damages or an amount set
by law." Other popular approaches to limiting the size and
frequency of punitive damage awards include increasing the
burden of proof for punitive damages claims to "clear and
convincing" evidence,' and requiring bifurcated trials to keep
potentially prejudicial evidence relevant to punitive damages
out of the liability and compensatory phase of the trial.'
Unlike punitive damages, which are meant to punish
bad conduct and deter the defendant and others from taking
similar actions, pain and suffering awards are intended to
reasonably compensate an injured party for past and future
pain and suffering caused by the defendant.' Because pain and
suffering awards are inherently subjective, courts generally
will not second-guess the jury's decision making. "Juries are
left with nothing but their consciences to guide them. " "
Arden-Mayfair, Inc., 726 P.2d 8, 23 (Wash. 1986) (holding that punitive damages are
not allowed unless expressly authorized by statute). Michigan permits "exemplary"
damages as compensation for mental suffering consisting of a sense of insult, indignity,
humiliation, or injury to feelings, but does not permit punitive damages for purposes of
punishment. See Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Tri-City Motors, 429 N.W.2d 871, 881 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1988).
62 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73 (West 2003); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-51-32, -4 (West 2003); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42.005 (Michie 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1D-25(b) (2003).
6 The United States Supreme Court specifically endorsed the "clear and
convincing evidence" burden of proof standard in punitive damages cases. See Pac.
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 n.l1 (1991) (stating that "[tihere is much to
be said in favor of a State's requiring, as many do, . . . a standard of 'clear and
convincing evidence'"). More than half of the states and the District of Columbia now
require a claimant to meet this higher evidentiary standard before a jury can award
punitive damages. See PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S CASES AND MATERALMS ON
TORTS 562-63 (Victor E. Schwartz et al. eds., 10th ed. 2000) [hereinafter PROSSER,
WADE & SCHWARTZ]. Colorado has adopted an even higher standard of "proof beyond a
reasonable doubt" for an award of punitive damages. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-25127(2) (West 2003).
See PROSSER, WADE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 63, at 562 (citing cases and
statutes providing for bifurcation of trials when the plaintiff seeks punitive damages).
65 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 (compensatory damages)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73
CALIF. L. REV. 772, 778 (1985). In order to control the potential for arbitrary and
excessive pain and suffering awards, several state legislatures have placed limits on
noneconomic damages. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 663-8.7 (Michie 2003)
(limiting "recoverable pain and suffering" to $375,000); IDAHO CODE § 6-1603 (Michie
2003) (limiting noneconomic damages in cases of "personal injury, including death"
excluding those arising out of willful or reckless conduct or acts constituting a felony to
$250,000, adjusted for inflation); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-19a02(a)-(b) (2002) (limiting
noneconomic damages to $250,000 in "any action seeking damages for personal injury
or death."); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-108(b) (2003) (limiting
noneconomic damages to $500,000 "in any action for damages for personal injury or
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As plaintiffs find themselves constrained in their
recovery of punitive damage awards, ostensibly compensatory
pain and suffering awards have reached hundred-million-dollar
levels.67 The rise in hedonic damages compounds this improper
new use of pain and suffering awards because, as with pain
and suffering awards, they have the potential to be used for
punitive, rather than compensatory, purposes.' As the New
York Court of Appeals recognized in McDougald, "recovery for
wrongful death"). In most cases, state legislatures apply these limits only to medical
malpractice claims, which show great potential for excessive awards and may
effectively render health insurance unaffordable for the average consumer. See, e.g.,
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-64-302 (West 2003) (placing a $250,000 limit on
noneconomic damages in lawsuits against a "health care professional"); MASS. GEN.
LAwS. ch. 231 § 60H (2003) (limiting damages for pain and suffering in medical
malpractice cases "against a provider of health care" to $500,000 in most
circumstances); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 600.1483(1) (West 2003) (placing a $280,000
cap on noneconomic damages, and a $500,000 cap in certain special circumstances, in
actions "for damages alleging medical malpractice by or against a person or party");
MO. ANN. STAT. § 538.210 (West 2003) (limiting noneconomic damages to $350,000,
adjusted annually for inflation, in medical malpractice cases); MT. CODE ANN. § 25-9411(1)(a) (2002) (limiting recovery for noneconomic damages in malpractice lawsuits to
$250,000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-7.1 (2003) (placing a $400,000 cap, to be adjusted
for inflation, on noneconomic damages in lawsuits against a "health care provider"); W.
VA. CODE ANN. 55-7B-2(c) (Michie 2003) (placing a $250,000 cap on noneconomic
damages in medical malpractice cases per occurrence and placing a $1,000,000 cap in
the event that the statute's $250,000 cap is found unconstitutional); WISC. STAT.
§ 893.55(4) (2002) (placing a $350,000 general cap, adjusted annually for inflation, on
recovery in medical malpractice cases); see also Jonathan D. Glater, Pressure Increases
for Tighter Limits on Injury Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2003, at A6 (reporting
recent legislative activity to limit noneconomic damages in medical malpractice
lawsuits). Most states have not enacted general limits on pain and suffering awards.
6
See, e.g., Brown v. AC&S Corp., No. 12658-00 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 2002)
(awarding the family of a deceased brake mechanic $53 million in compensatory
damages, including $17 million in pain and suffering, for his asbestos-related injuries),
reported in New York Jury Awards Meso Victim, Family $53 Million for Brake Lining
Exposure, 1-12 MEALEY'S PROD. LIAB. & RISK 12 (2002); Miss. Jury Returns $150M
Verdict Against AC&S, Dresser Industries, 3M Corp., 16-19 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.:
ASBESTOS 1 (2001) (reporting award of $150 million in compensatory damages to six
plaintiffs who alleged they were merely exposed to asbestos but did not have actual
injuries - $25 million each); Rankin v. Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc., No. 2000-20 (Miss.
Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2001) (awarding $100 million in compensatory damages to ten
plaintiffs in a lawsuit against the makers of the heartburn drug Propulsid), reported in
Nation's First Rezulin Trial Ends in Settlement, 6-22 MEALEY'S EMERGING DRUGS &
DEVICES 15 (2001); Raimondi v. Ford Motor Co., No. H197262-5 (Cal. Ct. App. May 31,
2001) (unpublished) (awarding $38.1 million in compensatory damages to a driver in a
SUV stability case and $13 million for loss of consortium to his wife, which was cut in
half due to the plaintiffs contributory negligence), reported in Calif. Appeals Court
Upholds $25.88M Rollover Verdict, VERDICTS & SETTLEMENTS, July 9, 2001, at A13.
See generally Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Twisting the Purpose of
Pain and Suffering Awards: Turning Compensation Into "Punishment," 54 S.C. L. REV.
47 (2002); see also Adam Liptak, Pain-and-Suffering Awards Let Juries Avoid New
Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2002, at A14 (reporting how plaintiffs' lawyers are
repackaging punitive damages claims as pain-and-suffering damages due to state laws
limiting on the amount of punitive damage awards).
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noneconomic losses such as pain and suffering and loss of
enjoyment of life rests on 'the legal fiction that money damages
can compensate for a victim's injury."" The court noted that its
"willingness to indulge this fiction comes to an end, however,
when it ceases to serve the compensatory goals of tort recovery
[and] . . . can only result in assessing damages that are
punitive." 0 Because hedonic damages provide another basis
upon which a jury may award subjective damages outside the
limits on punitive damages, hedonic damages provide another
opportunity for awards to slip legislatively-imposed controls
designed to harmonize injury compensation with what a
socially useful industry or activity can bear before it is litigated
out of existence.
2. Escaping the Cognitive Awareness Requirement of
Non-Economic Damages
Apart from providing a backdoor through which to skirt
the limits on punitive damages, hedonic damages also provide
an opportunity to shortcut an important check on non-economic
damages generally: the cognitive awareness requirement. "A
predicate for noneconomic damages has always been a showing
that the plaintiff has actually or will actually experience that
item of damages in the future."' Traditional tort law requires
that the plaintiff have a "cognitive awareness" of his or her loss
to ensure that he or she receives compensation only for the
injuries actually suffered."
Plaintiffs' lawyers have argued that the cognitive
awareness requirement does not apply to hedonic damages,
seeking to recover essentially compensatory damages when
such damages would otherwise not be available. Importantly,
this decoupling can occur both in states that permit
consideration of hedonic damages as an element of pain and
suffering or disability, and those that allow recovery for lost
enjoyment of life as a separate element of damages. Damages
resulting in such cases can only be described as compensating
69

McDougald, 536 N.E.2d 372, 374-75, 73 N.Y.2d 246, 254 (N.Y. 1989)

(quoting Howard v. Letcher, 366 N.E.2d 64, 65, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 111 (N.Y. 1977)).
70 536 N.E.2d at 375, 73 N.Y.2d at 254.
7' Keene v. Brigham & Women's Hosp., Inc., 775 N.E.2d 725, 739 (Mass. App.
Ct.) (ruling that award of damages for loss of enjoyment of life should not be made
where an injured plaintiff lacks cognitive awareness of his loss), modified on other
grounds, 786 N.E.2d 824 (Mass. 2003).
72 See PROSSER, WADE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 63, at 535.
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for either the loss of life in the total abstract or punishing the
defendant for its actions, but serving no real compensatory
purpose.
For example, in Gregory v. Carey, a plaintiff who had
suffered catastrophic brain damage while being prepared for
knee surgery brought a medical malpractice action against his
doctor and the hospital.7 The trial court did not allow the
plaintiffs attorney to argue that the decedent suffered mental
anguish or disfigurement, finding the evidence insufficient to
show that the patient was ever aware of his injury." Over the
defendant's objections, however, the trial court permitted the
plaintiff to argue that he suffered a loss of enjoyment of life as
an element of pain, suffering, and disability, because the court
found that such damages did not require cognitive awareness."
The jury returned a verdict of $6.3 million, including seventy
thousand dollars for past pain and suffering, $930,000 for
future pain and suffering, forty-five thousand for past
disability, and $900,000 for future disability, plus lost income
and medical expenses." The Supreme Court of Kansas upheld
the award, holding that the court properly permitted the jury
to consider loss of enjoyment of life as an element of pain and
suffering and disability, and properly refused to require
cognitive awareness of the loss of enjoyment of life.77
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reached
a similar conclusion in response to a certified question from the
United States Court of Appeals. In Flannery v. United States,
the West Virginia court was asked whether "a plaintiff in a
personal injury action who has been rendered permanently
semi-comatose is entitled to recover for the impairment of his
capacity to enjoy life."78 The court answered in the affirmative:
[Tihe loss of enjoyment of life is encompassed within and is an
element of the permanency of the plaintiffs injury. To state the
matter in a slightly different manner, the degree of permanent
injury is measured by ascertaining how the injury has deprived the

13

See Gregory v. Carey, 791 P.2d 1329 (Kan. 1990).
at 1334.

74 See id.
71 See id.
76

Id. at 1331.

77 Id. at 1337; see also Leiker v. Gafford, 778 P.2d 823
(Kan. 1989) (finding

that loss of enjoyment of life damages is valid subcomponent of pain and suffering and
disability damages). But see Hogan v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 85 P.2d 28 (Kan.
1934) (finding that loss of enjoyment of life damages are too speculative).
78 297 S.E.2d 433. 434 (W. Va. 1982).
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plaintiff of his customary activities as a whole person. The loss of
79
customary activities constitutes the loss of enjoyment of life.

The West Virginia court then concluded that an award for
disability was not subject to a cognitive awareness requirement
and permitted the plaintiff to recover for loss of enjoyment of
life even though he was unaware of the loss. The Supreme
Court of Ohio has also permitted recovery of hedonic damages
even when the plaintiff is not aware of his lost enjoyment of life
by permitting such recovery as an element of "the inability to
perform usual activities," rather than as a component of pain
0
and suffering."
Other courts, however, have come to a very different
conclusion and required that a plaintiff actually experience a
loss of enjoyment of life to obtain such recovery, a result that is
consistent with general principals of tort law. For example, in
McDougald, the New York Court of Appeals recognized that
the temptation to achieve a balance between injury and
damages has nothing to do with meaningful compensation for
the victim:8
Instead, the temptation is rooted in a desire to punish the defendant
in proportion to the harm inflicted. However relevant such
retributive symmetry may be in the criminal law, it has no place in
the law of civil damages, at least in the absence of culpability beyond
82
mere negligence.

In order to promote consistency and the general goals of
compensation in tort law, the court held that cognitive
awareness is a prerequisite to recovery of any aspect of nonpecuniary loss.'
A California appellate court recently reached the same
conclusion in a medical malpractice action in which the
plaintiff, a newborn baby, experienced profound brain damage
shortly after birth. In that case, the appellate court ruled that
the trial judge properly denied a request to instruct the jury on
loss of enjoyment of life as a separate element of damages.' In
addition to expressing concern about the potential for
" Id. at 436.
"0 See Fantozzi v. Sandusky Cement Prods. Co., 597 N.E.2d 474, 486 (Ohio
1992).
81 See McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372 (N.Y. 1989).
82 Id. at 375.

s See id.
84 See Keene v. Brigham & Women's Hosp., Inc., 775 N.E.2d 725 (Mass. App.
Ct.), review granted, 777 N.E.2d 1263 (Mass. 2002).
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duplicative damages, the court found that an award for injuries
for which the plaintiff is unaware "is not compensatory but
punitive in nature, requiring Legislative authority. " '
A cognitive awareness requirement for the recovery of
pain and suffering is a necessary prerequisite if noneconomic
damage awards are to serve some compensatory function. In
sum, unless the plaintiff shows that he actually felt the claimed
pain and suffering, such an award becomes not only a "legal
fiction," but can only be understood as a means of punishment
or as reallocation of wealth without regard to actual harm.
Hedonic damages, as an element of pain and suffering, should
be subject to this same threshold requirement.
3. Thwarting Wrongful Death and Survival Statutes
Wrongful death and survival actions generally permit
the survivors of the deceased to recover only pecuniary loss.
Since the applicable law typically permits neither pain and
suffering damages nor punitive awards, plaintiffs have turned
to hedonic damages to dramatically increase their recovery.
The historical public policy background on both wrongful death
and survivorship actions shows why its is both sound and fair
to limit awards to true pecuniary damages.
In the 1808 case of Baker v. Bolton, Lord Ellenborough
declared that "[i]n a civil Court, the death of a human being
could not be complained of as an injury."' This case, which
ruled that a husband had no action for the loss of his wife's
services through her death, has been credited with originating
the English common law rule that a person had no cause of
action against a tortfeasor for causing the death of another. 7 In
essence, the cause of action died with the victim and the
common law provided no compensation for the victim's
dependents or heirs.' Under this harsh rule, tortfeasors, who
otherwise would have been liable if a victim survived, escaped
Id. at 739; see also Ramos v. Kuzas, 600 N.E.2d 241 (Ohio
1992) (ruling
that a newborn who was injured either in utero or at birth was not entitled to hedonic
damages because he or she does not have adequate time to develop an understanding of
pleasurable activities). But see Cepeda v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 303
A.D. 173, 756 N.Y.S.2d 189 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 2003) (ruling that the mother of a
deceased child could recover $750,000 for her infant's conscious lost enjoyment of life
and pain and suffering during twelve days of life between birth and death).
Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033
(1808).
87 See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 127,
at 945 (W. PAGE KEETON et
al. ed., 5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
"8 See id.
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all liability if the victim died before issuance of a judgment. A
spouse or parent could not even recover for expenses incurred
due to the death of a loved one, such as funeral expenses or the
loss of financial support.'9 The odd result was that "it was
cheaper for the defendant to kill the plaintiff than to injure
him."
The English Parliament corrected this situation in 1846
with adoption of the Fatal Accidents Act, commonly known as
"Lord Campbell's Act."'" This statute allowed the personal
representative of a victim to recover for the benefit of close
relatives for their pecuniary loss, so long as the victim would
have had a cause of action had he or she survived.' The
amount recoverable was based upon proof of the likely
contribution the deceased would have provided to the
beneficiaries during his or her lifetime." It did not take long for
the English law to spread across the Atlantic. New York
adopted the first "wrongful death act" in 1847.' Currently,
every state has enacted a similar law.
Wrongful death statutes compensate the close family of
the victim for expenses and lost income and services after the
victim's death." Wrongful death actions are intended to
compensate the individual beneficiaries for the present value of
the lost economic benefit that they might reasonably have
expected to receive from the decedent in the form of support,
services, or contributions during the remainder of his lifetime.'
Like wrongful death statutes, survival statutes
generally abrogate the common law rule that once a person
7
dies, his or her cause of action dies as well. Thus, under a
supra note 65, § 925.
90 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 87, § 127, at 945.
"' See id.
92 RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, § 925.
93 Id.
89 See RESTATEMENT,

94 See McDavid v. United States, 584 S.E.2d 226 (W. Va. 2003) (discussing
the history of wrongful death acts and ruling that, under West Virginia's expansive
law, a court may award pain and suffering endured between the time of injury and the
time of death, even when the decedent did not institute an action for personal injury
prior to his or her death, so long as there is evidence of conscious pain and suffering of
the decedent prior to death).
9 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, § 925, cmt. a.
9 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 87, § 127, at 949. A handful of states have
enacted more liberal statutes that compute damages based on the loss to the estate,
rather than the loss to the beneficiaries. Under these laws, damages are determined
based on the decedent's expected lifetime earnings, less his living expenses or
contributions, or some variation of that formula. Id. § 127, at 950 & n.69.
" See RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, § 926, cmt. a.
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survival action, once a cause of action vests in the victim of a

tort, it is not extinguished at death."8 The executor or
administrator of the victim's estate may sue to recover that
which the victim would have recovered, and is subject to the
same defenses that would have applied had the victim lived.
This means that under a survival action, the estate may
recover for pain and suffering, loss of earnings, and any other
injury the victim incurred, up until the date of his or her
death ."
Some state codes provide for both a wrongful death and
survival statute."' Other states provide for wrongful death and
0 '
survival actions within a single statute."
Most states do not
permit recovery for the grief or mental suffering of the
decedent's beneficiaries or survivors through a wrongful death
or survival action.' Likewise, few states allow recovery of
punitive damages in such actions.' 3 In deciding to limit
recovery in death actions to pecuniary loss and sometimes noneconomic harm incurred prior to death, the states followed the
strict construction originally given to Lord Campbell's Act. The
English courts restricted damages to pecuniary losses because
they were "alarmed at the difficulty of evaluating the
impalpable injuries to sentiments and affections because of
death.""° American courts also feared that death actions could
lead to excessive verdicts and provide a windfall to the estate.'05
An extreme minority of jurisdictions permit recovery of
damages for lost enjoyment of life in wrongful death or survival
actions. In 1976, the Connecticut Supreme Court became what
appears to be the first court to permit the recovery of hedonic

98 See generally Payne v. Eighth
Judicial District Ct., 60 P.3d 469, 472-73
(Mont. 2002) (explaining the distinction between wrongful death and survival actions).
See id. (noting that "loss or impairment
of earning capacity, pain,
emotional disturbances and other harms are limited to those occurring before death").
too See RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, §§
925, 926.
101 See id. § 925, cmt. b.3.
102 A few states, however, provide
an expansive definition of pecuniary loss
and permit recovery for items such as "loss of guidance and counseling" for a minor
child who loses a parent or guardian. See, e.g., Romero v. Byers, 872 P.2d 840, 846
(N.M.1994).
103 But see Bond v. City of Huntington,
276 S.E.2d 539, 545 (W. Va. 1981)
(interpreting W. VA. CODE § 55-7-6 to allow a decedent's beneficiaries to recover
punitive damages for the wrongful act of the defendant).
104 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
87, at 951 (citing Blake v. Midland R. Co.,
18 Q.B. 93, 118 Eng. Rep. 42 (1852)).
105 Id.
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damages in such actions.' °6 Since then, four other states have
construed their wrongful death statutes to permit such
recovery, including Hawaii, New Hampshire, New Mexico, and,
7
most recently, Mississippi (until superceded by statute)."
At least twenty jurisdictions have either expressly or
impliedly rejected the availability of hedonic damages in
wrongful death actions." The courts have done so either by
limiting hedonic damages to the period between injury and
death, or by concluding that hedonic damages were a subset of
pain and suffering, which necessarily requires conscious
awareness. Among these are state courts or federal courts
interpreting state law in Arkansas, California, Delaware,
Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Michigan,
Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, and
Wisconsin.' 9 As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania explained,
See Choctaw Maid Farms, Inc. v. Hailey, 822 So. 2d 911, 931 (Miss. 2002)
(Cobb, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Katsetos v. Nolan, 368 A.2d
172 (Conn. 1976)).
107 See Choctaw Maid Farms, 822 So. 2d at 922-23 (interpreting MISS. CODE
106

ANN. § 11-7-13 to allow recovery of damages of "every kind and nature"); Marcotte v.
Timberlane/Hampstead Sch. Dist., 733 A.2d 394, 399 (N.H. 1999) (permitting recovery
under N.H. REV. STAT. § 556:12, which allows for consideration of the "probable
duration of his life but for the injury"); Romero v. Byers, 872 P.2d 840, 847 (N.M. 1994)
(construing language of N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-1 to not limit recovery to pecuniary
damages); Kiniry v. Danbury Hosp., 439 A.2d 408, 414-15 (Conn. 1981) (construing
"just damages" under CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-555 to include compensation for the
"destruction of life's enjoyment"); Ozaki v. Ass'n of Apartment Owners by Discovery
Bay, 954 P.2d 652, 668 (Haw. Ct. App. 1998), affd in part and vacated in part on other
grounds, 954 P.2d 644 (Haw. 1998) (construing HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-7 to allow
recovery for the diminished joy of living).
817
108 See Choctaw Maid Farms,822 So. 2d at 931 (citing Bailey v. Rose Ctr.,
S.W.2d 412, 415 (Ark. 1991).
Court, 49
109 See Choctaw Maid Farms, 822 So. 2d at 931; Garcia v. Superior
F. Supp.
747
Inc.,
Coll.,
Wesley
v.
Sterner
1996);
App.
Ct.
(Cal.
581
Cal. Rpt. 2d 580,
263, 273 (D. Del. 1990); Brown v. Seebach, 763 F. Supp. 574, 583 (S.D. Fla. 1991);
Southlake Limousine & Coach, Inc. v. Brock, 578 N.E.2d 677, 680 (Ind. App. 1991);
Poyzer v. McGraw, 360 N.W.2d 748, 753 (Iowa 1985); Leiker v. Gafford, 778 P.2d 823,
835, 838 (Kan. 1989), overruled on other grounds by Martindale v. Tenny, 829 P.2d 561,
566 (Kan. 1992); Phillips v. Eastern Me. Med. Ctr., 565 A.2d 306, 309 (Me. 1989);
Smallwood v. Bradford, 720 A.2d 586 (Md. 1998); Brereton v. United States, 973 F.
Supp. 752, 757 (E.D. Mich. 1997); Anderson/Couvillon v. Neb. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 538
N.W.2d 732, 739 (Neb. 1995); Smith v. Whitaker, 734 A.2d 243, 246 (N.J. 1999);
Nussbaum v. Gibstein, 73 N.Y.2d 912, 536 N.E.2d 618 (1989); Pitman v. Thorndike,
762 F. Supp. 870, 872 (D. Nev. 1991); Livingston v. United States, 817 F. Supp. 601
(E.D.N.C. 1993); First Trust Co. v. Scheels Hardware & Sports Shop, Inc., 429 N.W.2d
5, 13 (N.D. 1988); Willinger v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr., 393 A.2d 1188, 1190-91 (Pa.
1978); Spencer v. A-1 Crane Serv., Inc., 880 S.W.2d 938, 943 (Tenn. 1994); Bulala v.
Boyd, 389 S.E.2d 670, 677 (Va. 1990); Tait v. Wahl, 987, P.2d 127, 131 (Wash. Ct. App.
1999); Prunty v. Schwantes, 162 N.W.2d 34, 38 (Wis. 1968); Kemp v. Pfizer, Inc., 947 F.
Supp. 1139 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
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Unlike one who is permanently injured, one who dies as a result of
injuries is not condemned to watch life's amenities pass by. Unless
we are to equate loss of life's pleasures with the loss of life itself, we
must view it as something that is compensable only for a living
plaintiff who has suffered from that loss. It follows that ...damages
for the pain and suffering that may flow from the loss of life's
pleasures should only be recovered for the period of time between the
accident and the decedent's death. 110

A Washington appellate court put it somewhat differently:
"Our survival statutes preserve claims that a living person
could have brought; that is, they govern only 'predeath
damages.' They do not create claims on behalf of dead persons
for the loss of life itself."". In sum, the overly subjective and
unwieldy aspect of hedonic damages that would arise if they
were given to a living person are geometrically magnified if
awarded in either survival or wrongful death claims, where the
injured party cannot even attempt to describe the injury, and
jurors cannot measure the difference between the life before
and after the injury in order to come to their own conclusions.
The overwhelming majority of courts and legislatures has
recognized these facts and rejected such claims.
C.

Expert Testimony on Hedonic Damages PromotesLarge,
Arbitrary Awards and is Scientifically Unsound

What is the total value of the pleasure of life or of life
itself? Many purported hedonic experts, including Dr. Stanley
Smith, who literally wrote the book on hedonic damages, use
what is called the "willingness to pay" (WTP) approach."2 The
WTP approach measures the value of a human life by
examining "what we pay to prevent the loss of life, [or] what we
pay for life-saving measures." 3 This approach considers three
models to quantify the value of life for the jury: (1) consumer
willingness to purchase safety devices; (2) worker willingness
to accept higher compensation for a greater risk of death; and
(3) the government's willingness to impose safety regulations
110 Willinger v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr., 393 A.2d 1188, 1191 (Pa. 1978).
I

Otani v. Broudy, 59 P.3d 126, 130 (Wash. App. 2002)
(citations

omitted).
112See MICHAEL L. BROOKSHIRE & STAN V. SMITH, ECONOMIC/HEDONIC
DAMAGES: THE PRACTICE BOOK FOR PLAINTIFF AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 167 (1990
&
1992-1993 cum. supp.) [hereinafter BROOKSHIRE & SMITH].
"' Scharrrel v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 949 P.2d 89, 92 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997)
(alteration in original) (quoting an economist introduced as an expert witness
on
hedonic damages); see also BROOKSHIRE & SMITH, supra note 112, at 166-75.
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on private industry and the cost of such regulation."' Each of
these models attempts to quantify how much a person would be
willing to pay to avoid death. While these models may have
theoretic or academic value, they have little applicability when
used in a courtroom to determine the value a particular
individual placed on life for compensatory purposes.
The first model evaluates consumer behavior. This
model attempts to determine the additional price a person is
willing to pay for a safer product or a safety device, such as an
airbag or smoke detector, and the reduction of the risk of death
resulting from such purchases."' It then uses this information
to estimate a monetary value people place on life. Basically,
this method calculates the value of life by multiplying the
probability of saving a single life by the cost of the safety
device. For instance, assume that an optional driver's side air
bag costs $500, and that this air bag reduces the chance of
death in an accident from six in 10,000 down to two in 10,000.
Reducing the chance of dying by four in 10,000, or one chance
in 2,500, at a cost of $500 suggests, according to this theory,
that the consumers place a value of $1,250,000 (2,500 x $500)
on their lives. Another way of looking at this figure is that
consumers have spent $1,250,000 on 2,500 devices that,
"
probability shows, are likely to save a single statistical life. '
The second model, sometimes referred to as the
"individual avoidance" approach, is based on the theory that
workers will demand higher wages in jobs with a greater risk
of death."7 This estimate "would be exclusively linked to
earnings potential in wages, salary, and other direct forms of
compensation.""8 For example, consider a twenty-five-year-old
college graduate earning forty thousand dollars a year who
works as a salesperson - an occupation with a negligible workrelated risk of death. Suppose that he is now offered a different
job, with a one in 10,000 annual risk of death, so that if 10,000
"4

See BROOKSHIRE & SMITH, supra note 112, at 166-70; see also Anderson v.

Neb. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 538 N.W.2d 732, 742 (Neb. 1995).
115See BROOKSHIRE & SMITH, supra note 112, at 167.
116 Consumer purchases of smoke detectors provide another example. Assume
on smoke
that consumers make an aggregate expenditure of $150 million dollars
year.
each
lives
fifty
save
to
estimated
are
detectors
smoke
detectors, and that these
This represents an aggregate safety expenditure of $150 million divided by fifty lives,
or $3 million per statistical life saved.
117 See BROOKSHIRE & SMITH, supra note 112, at 167.
A
118 See Edward P. Berld et al., Hedonic Damages and Personal Injury:
at
available
Conceptual Approach, J. FORENSIC ECON., DEC. 1989, at 1, 4,
http://www.vocecon.com/pdffiles/articles/hedonic.pdf
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people work at this job for a year, then it is probable that a
work-related accident will claim the life of one. If the individual
is willing to accept a job with a one in 10,000 chance of death
for an additional $5,000 in salary, then it would stand to
reason, according to this theory, that he or she would accept
certain death for 10,000 times this amount, or $50,000,000
dollars. Under the individual avoidance approach, this dollar
amount is the value the college student places on his life.
The third model is based on the cost-benefit analysis
conducted by government agencies in deciding whether to
adopt a safety regulation. 19' In the early 1980s, President
Ronald Reagan issued an executive order requiring federal
agencies to do cost-benefit studies to justify their regulations.'2
As a result, agencies such as the Food and Drug
Administration, Consumer Product Safety Commission, and
Environmental Protection Agency began using a dollar value of
human lives saved to support their regulations."' According to
Dr. Smith, most of these government studies "show [a]
willingness to implement legislation at a cost of approximately
two million dollars per life saved; very little legislation beyond
three million.""
After determining the total value of life, experts who
subscribe to the WTP approach subject this amount to a "loss of
the pleasure of life" (LPL) scale to determine hedonic
damages.3 Under the LPL scale, an injury resulting in missed
work and disruption of family life for a few days is rated
"minimal" with a one to seventeen percent loss
of the pleasure
of life."' On the far end of the scale, a person who is bedridden
and requires daily nursing care has suffered a "catastrophic"
loss eliminating eighty-three to one hundred percent of the
pleasure of life."5 Thus, a mental health professional would rate
"an individual's degree of diminution of life that
has been
experienced from the date of injury to the date of the
See BROOKSHIRE & SMITH, supra note
112, at 167-68.
See Paul R. Bjorklund, Basics of Hedonic
Damages, CPA J. ONLINE, Nov.
1993, available at http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/old/14628736.htm (last
visited
Mar. 13, 2004) (concluding that "hedonic damages have no valid foundation for
use in
personal injury or wrongful death cases").
1,9

120

121

See id.

Anderson v. Neb. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 538 N.W.2d
732, 743 (Neb. 1995).
See Berld et al., supra note 118, at 2; see
also BROOKSHIRE & SMITH, supra
note 112, at 168-74.
124 See Berld et
al., supra note 118, at 3.
125 See id.
122
123
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evaluation and then estimates the degree of diminution of life
over the individual's remaining life span."2 An expert can then

apply the percentage, which may vary over the course of a
person's lifetime, to the total dollar value of life to determine
hedonic damages. According to Dr. Smith and his colleagues,
writing over a decade ago, "Im]ost estimates [of the value of
life] range from high six-figure amounts to high seven-figure
employ
amounts.". 7 Other "experts" on hedonic damages
8
life."'
of
value
the
similar approaches to determining
Although a few courts permit the introduction of expert
129
testimony on hedonic damages, the "willingness-to-pay model
*

is a troubled science in the courtroom, with the vast

3
majority of published opinions rejecting the evidence." ' Most
126

Id.

127 See id. at 4; see also BROOKSHIRE

& SMITH, supra note 112, at 168-69. In

$1.9 and
most cases, Dr. Smith and other economists advocate a value of life of between
1999)
Mass.
(D.
145
141,
2d
Supp.
F.
47
Co.,
&
Roebuck
Sears
v.
Saia
$3.3 million. See
151
($3.3 million); Estate of Sinthasomphone v. City of Milwaukee, 878 F. Supp. 147,
571, 575
2d
Rptr.
Cal.
70
Corp.,
Truck-A-Way
v.
Loth
million);
($2.3
1995)
Wisc.
(E.D.
578
(Cal. Ct. App. 1998) ($2.3 million); Southlake Limousine & Coach, Inc. v. Brock,
N.E.2d 677, 679 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) ($1.9 million); Lewis v. Alfa Laval Separation,
are net
Inc., 714 N.E.2d 426, 429-30 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) ($2.6 million). These figures
of expected lifetime earnings.
128 See, e.g., Anderson v. Hale, No. CIV-02-0113-F, 2002 WL 32026151, at *7
that
(W.D. Okla. Nov. 4, 2002) (rejecting the testimony of the plaintiffs expert witness
20%
a
suffered
had
he
that
and
million
$3
was
life
plaintiffs
the
of
the pre-injury value
loss of this value).
Sherrod v.
12 See BROOKSHIRE & SMITH, supra note 112, at 174-75; see, e.g.,
Cir. 1987)
Berry, 629 F. Supp. 159 (N.D. Ill. 1985), aff'd, 827 F.2d 195, 205-06 (7th
F.2d 1222
835
vacated,
jury),
the
to
"invaluable"
testimony
(finding Dr. Stanley Smith's
(Miss. 2001)
(7th Cir. 1988); Kansas City S. R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 798 So. 2d 374, 382-83
as to
(superceded by statute) (finding that "[a]lthough there is some honest dispute
of
whether Dr. Smith's testimony was generally accepted in his field, the question
specialized
whether the proffered witness had obtained the required degree of
trial
knowledge within a particular field is a matter within the sound discretion of the
were
court" and that it was the jury's duty to determine if the expert's conclusions
"unreliable, invalid, or speculative"); Lewis v. Alfa Laval Separation, Inc., 714 N.E.2d
Michael
426 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (permitting the testimony of economist Dr.
Book for
Practice
The
Damages;
Economic/Hedonic
co-authored
who
Brookshire,
Hunt v. KPlaintiffand Defense Attorneys, supra note 112, with Dr. Smith); see also
make a
Mart Corp., 981 P.2d 275 (Mont. 1999) (finding that the defendant failed to
psychologist
a
from
testimony
expert
of
admission
the
to
timely and specific objection
and economist on hedonic damages at trial).
1996). For a
130 Kurnz v. Honda N. Am., Inc., 166 F.R.D. 386, 388 (W.D. Mich,
sampling of cases rejecting expert testimony on hedonic damages, see, for example,
Coll., Inc., 747
Mercado v. Ahmed, 974 F.2d 863, 871 (7th Cir. 1992); Sterner v. Wesley
317, 320-22
F. Supp. 263, 274 (D. Del. 1990); Sullivan v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 862 F. Supp.
1999);
Mass.
(D.
141
2d
Supp.
F.
47
Co.,
&
Roebuck
Sears
v.
Saia
(D. Kan. 1994);
887
Livingston v. United States, 817 F. Supp. 601 (E.D.N.C. 1993); Ayers v. Robinson,
Tenn.
(M.D.
230
Supp.
F.
868
Co.,
&
Merck
v.
Hein
1995);
Ill.
(N.D.
1049
Supp.
F.
1994); Loth v. Truck-A-Way Corp., 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 571, 577-78 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998);
Scharrrel v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 949 P.2d 89, 91-93 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997); Montalvo
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courts find for various reasons that "economic theories which

attempt to extrapolate the 'value' of human life from various
studies of wages, costs, etc., have no place in the calculation of
general damages,""' or as a separate element of damages.
Courts have rejected expert testimony on hedonic damages
under both the Frye "general acceptance" test'32 and the
Daubert standard for relevancy and reliability of scientific
evidence.' 3 In fact, one commentator who noted this trend
observed that "[wie may be on the way to a kind of judicial
notice of the unreliability of [expert testimony of valuation of
hedonic damages]."" One trial court judge went so far as to
rule that "any attempted Daubert/Kumho analysis of [a WTP]
theory is undertaken only at the risk of according it undue
dignity. . . . Merely to pose the question of whether [the
proposed expert's] proffered approach to hedonic damages
demonstrates 'intellectual rigor,' is to answer the question."33
v. Lapez, 884 P.2d 345, 364-67 (Haw. 1994); Fetzer v. Wood, 569 N.E.2d 1237 (Ill.
App.
Ct. 1991); Southlake Limousine v. Brock, 578 N.E.2d 677 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Foster
v.
Trafalger House Oil & Gas, 603 So. 2d 284, 286 (La. Ct. App. 1992); Anderson
v. Neb.
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 538 N.W.2d 732, 741-45 (Neb. 1995); McGarry v. Horlacher,
775
N.E.2d 865, 877-78 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002); Wilt v. Buracker, 443 S.E.2d 196, 205
(W.
Va.), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1129 (1993); Liston v. Univ. of W. Va. Bd. Of Trustees,
438
S.E.2d 590 (W.Va. 1993); see also Schumann v. Mo. H'way & Trans. Comm'n,
912
S.W.2d 548, 554-55 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (in case of first impression regarding
admissibility of expert testimony on hedonic damages, court opted not to decide
the
issue because it found no prejudice to the defendant, but noted that most states
have
rejected such testimony); McGuire v. City of Sante Fe, 954 F. Supp. 230 (D.N.M.
1996)
(harshly criticizing the use of expert testimony to quantify hedonic damages and
ruling
that hedonic damages are inappropriate in the employment discrimination context).
'31 Foster v. Trafalger House Oil
& Gas, 603 So. 2d 284, 286 (La. Ct. App.
1992).
132 See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir.
1923). Frye's "general
acceptance" test for the admission of scientific evidence was explained as follows:
"Just
when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental
and
the demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone
the
evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long
way
in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle
or
discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established
to have gained general acceptance in the particularfield in which it belongs." Id.
at
1014 (emphasis added).
'33 See generally Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Under Daubert, the court serves in a "gatekeeping role" and considers such factors
as
(1) whether the theory has been tested; (2) whether the theory has been subject to
peer
review; (3) the known or potential rate of error; (4) whether there is general acceptance
of the theory within the scientific community. See id.
134 Mark Geistfeld, Placing a
Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for
Helping Juries Determine Tort Damagesfor Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CAL. L. REV.
773,
811 (1995).
135 See Anderson v. Hale, No. CIV-02-0113-F,
2002 WL 32026151, at *7 (W.D.
Okla. Nov. 2, 2002).
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These courts recognize that the purpose of tort law is to
compensate for the actual harm to an individual, not to a
hypothetical person. The use of workforce statistics and "risk
avoidance" neither considers the plaintiff's actual lost
enjoyment of life, nor do the studies involve persons suffering a
permanent injury.'36 As a California appellate court observed,
The figures [Dr. Stanley] Smith included in his baseline calculation
have nothing to do with this particular plaintiffs injuries, condition,
hobbies, skills, or other factors relevant to her loss of enjoyment of
life.... By urging the jury to rely upon a baseline value supported
by factors having nothing to do with this plaintiffs individual
condition, Smith's testimony created the possibility of a runaway
37

jury verdict.'

Moreover, the testimony of an economist does not aid the jury
in determining a person's lost enjoyment of life because "an
economist is no more expert at valuing the pleasure of life than
the average juror. ' ...
Courts also reject expert testimony using the WTP
approach because "the calculations are based on assumptions
that appear to controvert logic and good sense."'" Each model
has various flaws. Regarding the consumer behavior model, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
reasoned:
We have serious doubts about [the] assertion that the studies [relied]
upon actually measure how much Americans value life ....
[S]pending on safety items reflects a consumer's willingness to pay to
reduce risk, perhaps more a measure of how cautious a person is
than how much he or she values life. Few of us when confronted with
the threat, "Your money or your life!" would, like Jack Benny, pause
and respond, "I'm thinking, I'm thinking." Most of us would empty
our wallets. Why that decision reflects less the value we place on life
than whether we buy an airbag is not immediately obvious."

Nor does the theory of individual avoidance work in
practice. For instance, those who choose to work in risky
professions, such as firemen or police officers, or as mining or
construction workers, get relatively low pay compared to those
in professions with a lower risk of death, such as bankers,
See Wilt v. Buracker, 443 S.E.2d 196, 204 (W. Va. 1993).
Loth v. Truck-A-Way Corp., 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 571, 578 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
138 Montalvo v. Lapez, 884 P.2d 345, 366 (Haw. 1994).
139 Wilt, 443 S.E.2d at 205.
in
141 Mercado v. Ahmed, 974 F.2d 863, 871 (7th Cir. 1992) (emphasis

'"'
'31

original).
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accountants, and nurses. If the risk avoidance theory held true,
people in high-risk professions would receive substantially
higher salary than those in professions with little risk of injury
or death. In reality, however, people do not have complete free
choice as to the professions they enter and may do so as a
matter of economic necessity. They also may choose to enter a
profession because of their personal interests or for altruistic
purposes, rather than for risk avoidance or purely monetary
reasons. Moreover, the proposition that a twenty-year-old who
takes a slightly higher salary due to a slightly higher risk of
death, would accept certain death for fifty million dollars, or
any amount of money, is laughable. Most people would not
accept certain death for any amount of money.
Specifically regarding the third model, the costs and
benefits of government safety laws and regulations have little
to do with the value that society places on life. A decision to
regulate is far more complex. It involves legislative
compromises, budgetary constraints, and political pressures,
among a host of other factors. One court noted that "federal
agencies have set the value of life as low as $70,000 and as
high as $132 million per life." 4 '
None of the models discussed above provides a
defensible estimate of the value of loss of the pleasure of life.
Furthermore, even if they did, the high estimates of hedonic
loss could cause jurors to depart from rational damages
calculations. Some courts have noted that even if the WTP
approach is scientifically sound, such evidence might be
excluded under the state equivalent of Federal Rule of
Evidence 403 because its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.' In the final
analysis, then, valuation problems in and of themselves should
lead states to disallow hedonic damage awards.
D.

The Subjective Nature of Hedonic Damage Awards
Provides Little Basis for Meaningful Appellate Review

It has taken many years for the United States Supreme
Court to develop constitutional standards to curb excessive

Ayers v. Robinson, 887 F. Supp. 1049, 1061
n.4
Ill.
1995).
See, e.g., Anderson v. Neb. Dep't of Soc. Servs., (N.D.
538 N.W.2d 732, 744 (Neb.
1995); Ayers v. Robinson, 887 F. Supp. 1049, 1058-64 (N.D. Il.1995);
Foster v.
Trafalgar House Oil & Gas, 603 So. 2d 284, 286 (La. Ct. App. 1992).
141
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13
punitive damage awards. " Because punitive damages are a
form of state-imposed punishment, such awards are subject to
a due process analysis for excessiveness. The analysis considers
the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, the ratio of
actual damages to punitive damages, and "civil or criminal
comparable misconduct."' ...
penalties that could be imposed for
Most recently, Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court in State
Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Campbell reaffirmed that
"Is]ingle-digit multipliers [of compensatory to punitive
damages] are more likely to comport with due process" than
larger ratios. 1' Higher ratios, Kennedy wrote, may be upheld
where "a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small
46
On the other hand, "[wihen
amount of economic damages.'
compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio,
perhaps only equal to compensatory damages,7 can reach the
outermost limit of the due process guarantee."'
Pain and suffering awards, unlike punitive damages,
are not subject to such constitutional standards. The only guide
for appellate review in most states is whether the 4jury's award
is so large as to "shock the conscious of the court" ' or whether
See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424
de novo rather
(2001) (constitutionality of punitive damages award is to be reviewed
517 U.S. 559
than under abuse of discretion standard); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore,
and setting
awards
punitive
of
amount
the
on
limits
substantive
(1996) (establishing
of the
up a three-pronged constitutional test which considers the reprehensibility
plaintiff, and the
the
to
harm
the
and
penalty
the
between
relationship
the
misconduct,
Motor Co., Ltd. v.
civil and criminal penalties for comparable misbehavior); Honda
the amount of
Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994) (prohibiting judicial review in most cases of
Fourteenth
the
of
Clause
Process
Due
the
violates
jury
by
punitive damages awarded
(holding
Amendment); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 454 (1993)
"grossly
of
imposition
prevents
Amendment
Fourteenth
of
Clause
that the Due Process
1 (1991) (ruling
excessive" award on tortfeasor); Pac. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 4991 U.S.
analysis).
that punitive damages awards are subject to constitutional due process
See Gore, 517 U.S. at 583.
'4
141 See State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1524 (2003).
141

146

Id.

The Court also ruled that neither a defendant's wealth nor its out-ofthat a punitive
state conduct could be a factor in calculating punitive damages, and
involving the
damage award must be limited to the reprehensibility of the act
427-28.
421-22,
at
id.
See
case.
the
in
particular individual
141 See, e.g., Shepard v. Capitol Foundry of Va., Inc., 554 S.E.2d 72, 75 (Va.
also Wells
2001) (quoting Edmiston v. Kupsenel, 135 S.E.2d 777, 780 (Va. 1964)); see
Fargo Armored Serv. Corp. v. Turner, 543 So. 2d 154, 158 (Miss. 1989).
as
The damages ... must be so excessive as to strike mankind, at first blush,
as
being beyond all measure, unreasonable, and outrageous, and such
manifestly show the Jury to have been actuated by passion, partiality,
prejudice, or corruption. In short, the damages must be flagrantly outrageous
the
and extravagant, where they have no standard by which to ascertain
excess.
141

Id.
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the award resulted from a clear abuse of the trial court's
discretion."49 Appellate courts express great reluctance to reduce
the amounts of pain and suffering awards post-trial both
because of their subjective nature and because "jurors'
judgment on these issues is believed to represent the very
sense of the community that justifies the jury system in the
first place."'' 0 This can lead to extreme variability between
awards in similar cases, which "undermines the legal system's
claim that like cases will be treated alike.''
Hedonic damages provide a new prospect for out-ofcontrol awards. Whether a hedonic damage award is excessive
is evaluated according to the same vague, deferential standard
as a pain and suffering award. As the dissenting opinion in
Choctow Maid Farmsrecognized:
Appellate courts would be without adequate basis for meaningful
review. Would defendants, under the rule proposed by the majority,
be entitled to put on evidence that the decedent's life was worth very
little - because he was a habitual criminal or a drug user, a member
of some disfavored social, political or religious group, or physically or
mentally handicapped, or just unhappy? Or would such evidence be
excluded as prejudicial, leaving defendants no meaningful way to
rebut?..

In the case of hedonic damages, appellate judges would not
even have the benefit of a substantial number of verdicts in
similar cases in order to take an objective, comparative

Id. (citations omitted). See also Crewdson v. Burlington N. R. Co., 452 N.W.2d 270
(Neb. 1990). In Crewdson, the court noted that a number of jurisdictions have adopted
a rule that:
a verdict may be set aside as excessive or inadequate when, and not unless, it
is so excessive or inadequate as to be the result of passion, prejudice,
mistake, or some other means not apparent in the record. If a verdict shocks
the conscience, it necessarily follows that the verdict was the result of
passion, prejudice, mistake, or some other means not apparent in the record.

Id.

See, e.g., Trull v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 320 F.3d 1,
9 (ist Cir. 2002);
Reck v. Stevens, 373 So. 2d 498, 501 (La. 1979).
15 Schwartz & Lorber,
supra note 68, at 63.
15,See Oscar G. Chase, Helping Jurors Determine Painand Suffering Awards,
23 HoFrRA L. REV. 763, 769 (1995).
152Choctaw Maid Farms, Inc. v. Halley,
822 So. 2d 911, 934 (Miss. 2002)
(Cobb, J., dissenting). Justice Cobb's dissent continued, "I had hoped this Court would
learn from fifty years of experience of our brethren in England, and not wander down
this less traveled road, as they did, before realizing that awarding hedonic damages in
wrongful death actions only risks speculative, arbitrary awards and windfalls to
plaintiffs. This is a pandora's box we should not open." Id.
149
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approach to determining whether a hedonic damage award is
excessive."
When juries award damages that are so subjective and
so closely related to already-existing forms of compensation,
serious questions arise as to whether punitive damages have
been improperly, even unconsciously, misplaced on the
compensatory side of the ledger. If so, then those damage
awards are freed from the outer-limit constitutional constraints
that the Supreme Court has recently affirmed and applied with
some vigor. Not only do defendants face the possibility of
unforeseeable damage awards and the inability to tailor their
actions and businesses according to liability, but reviewing
courts lack the power to apply recent Supreme Court
jurisprudence designed to correct that problem, leaving it
unchecked.
IV. CONCLUSION

Hedonic damages, particularly when considered a
separate element of an award, are fraught with problems. They
are duplicative of awards for pain and suffering and disability.
Their subjectivity enhances the potential for excessive awards
that lack a compensatory purpose. They are supported by
dubious scientific measures proffered by experts who seek to
influence the jury to reach a multi-million dollar verdict. They
provide an attractive opportunity for plaintiffs' lawyers to
channel a jury's sympathy for an injured person or anger
toward a defendant into an award that is neither subject to
statutory limits nor to thorough judicial review.
Courts should recognize that adding unnecessary and
unwieldy hedonic damages to existing tort claims is unsound
public policy.4 Assets need to be preserved to compensate
"3 This is an approach used successfully by some courts to evaluate the size of
pain and suffering awards. See David Baldus et al., Improving Judicial Oversight of
Jury Damages Assessments: A Proposal for the Comparative Additur/Remittitur
Review of Awards for Nonpecuniary Harms and Punitive Damages, 80 IOWA L. REV.
1109, 1134-35 (1995) (noting that a comparative analysis of pain and suffering awards
is widely used to determine excessiveness in New York).
"4 The problems of hedonic damages are not unique to American courts.
Between 1935 and 1982, English courts permitted the award of hedonic damages, first
in personal injury cases, then in wrongful death cases. See generally Andrew J.
McClurg, It's a Wonderful Life: The Case for Hedonic Damages in Wrongful Death
Cases, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57, 106-09 (1990) (providing an in depth discussion for
the evolution and abolition of hedonic damages in England). Unlike hedonic damages
in American courts, English courts awarded relatively small sums for loss of enjoyment
of life and eventually adopted a standard £1,250 in wrongful death cases to be raised
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people for actual losses, and the lottery aspect of American tort
law needs to be shut down. If courts will not do it, then
state
legislatures, like that in Mississippi, as the principle
policy
makers of the state, should do so.

with inflation, as proper for a decedent's lost expectation of
life. See Benham v.
Gambling, 1941 A.C. 157 (ruling that £1,200 was an excessive
award for a child's lost
expectation of life and reduced the award to £200); Gammell v.
Wilson, 2 All E.R. 557
(C.A. 1980) (awarding a standardized hedonic award for the lost
expectation of life in
wrongful death cases to encourage uniformity). Despite the low
value of these awards,
the House of Lords expressed dissatisfaction with hedonic damages,
see Gammell v.
Wilson, 1982 A.C. 27, 74, and Parliament abolished such awards
in all cases in 1982.
See Administration of Justice Act of 1982, c. 53, § 1(1), (2) (Eng.).
The Administration
of Justice Act of 1982 did not completely eliminate consideration
of the lost enjoyment
of life in determining an award, but, as it should, provided that
courts could consider
such loss when assessing damages in respect to pain and suffering.
See id.

